July 23, 2004

OP ED:
Julie Archer 
Hedda L. Haning 

Other alternatives to e- voting change

We recently had the opportunity to share our concerns about touchscreen voting with the Marion County Commission; however, we feel significant issues were not adequately addressed.

First, while we understand that members of the commission may not have the time to sort through all the information available about voting systems, the commissioners are misinformed if they believe that the Help America Vote Act ( HAVA) requires touch- screen machines in every precinct by 2006. HAVAdoes require that each polling place provide at least one voting mechanism per polling place that allows disabled individuals to vote independently. There are other HAVA- compliant alternatives available that allow the disabled to voted unassisted, and more are being developed. The commission has choices, and voters concerned about the integrity of elections in Marion County should encourage the commission to explore them.

Secondly, iVotronics, the machines the commission plans to lease, and its software have recently been challenged in both Indiana and Florida. Not only was the software problematic, related to systems audits and lost votes, but so was the ES& S response of installing uncertified software apparently in secret.

While many people think of software as unchanging and unchangeable, it can be adaptive and respond to unpredictable behavior.

Computers have been programmed to play world- class chess and defeat their opponents a different way each time.

According to Bob Kibrick, a computer scientist and legislative analyst with Verified Voting, there are numerous ways DRE software could be rigged to intentionally steal votes during an election, while passing required pre- and post- election tests with flying colors. However, explains Kibrick, “ A related concern is that a DRE that was programmed by an honest programmer working for an honest voting machine company might unintentionally miscount votes during a real election because of an innocent programming bug.

“ In any large and complex computer program, there will be bugs, and at least some of those will slip through the cracks of software testing. Ask Microsoft. Ask IBM. Ask NASA. All of them spend millions ( and in some cases billions) of dollars every year on software testing, and yet once their products get deployed in the field, they discover new bugs, and they frequently have to issue emergency patches and updates to correct those bugs.

“ Those bugs didn’t show up during testing because that testing can never fully simulate every possible permutation of user input and can’t possibly test every possible pathway through the computer program. The same is true for “ logic and accuracy” testing and for ‘ parallel monitoring’ testing of voting machines. Just because a DRE computer program passes those tests does not guarantee that a DRE program will be bug - free.

“ This is what makes paperless DRE machines so dangerous.

There is no backup. Without a voter- verified paper ballot, there is no protection against the consequences of DRE programming bugs. Using a paperless DRE is like walking on a tightrope without a safety net. You might get lucky and make it across, but it is certainly not an act of a wise or prudent individual.”

Finally, we take exception to the idea expressed by some members of the commission that an election is all about trust. Democracy is based on mistrust. Our Constitution has checks and balances because the founding fathers knew of mankind’s less- than- angelic side.

West Virginia code requires witnesses during all procedures that include accessing voting machines or handling ballots. It requires a recount of 5 percent of randomly selected precincts. This indicates a healthy mistrust. While we may not always succeed in protecting the sanctity of the vote, that is no excuse for not even trying.

We understand that Marion County has just been through a horrific election experience; however, a more reasoned response could include simple measures such as developing a better ballot and the use of precinct scanners to protect against over- votes. The commission should carefully consider all the options. Selecting a questionable and demonstrably problematic system that does not allow for manual audit of the voter’s original intention, but rather relies on trust, is not the answer.

Julie Archer 
WVCitizen Action Group 
Charleston 

Hedda L. Haning 
WV Citizens for HAVA 
Charleston